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THE ETHICAL BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Any thoughtful reflection on the subject of international
relations raises important questions regarding the funda-
mental postulates underlying these relations. There is the
question whether, independently of treaty or custom, there
must be recognized a transcendent natural law binding states
as well as individuals. Again, does so-called "Public inter-
national law" deserve the name of law and command the
same respect as civil law? What is the physical and ethical
basis of such law? And what permanent success in diplomat-
ic relations can be expected as long as statesmen do not
admit any universal and absolute standard of ethical princi-
ples according to which concrete judgments of justice may
be enunciated?
It is not uncommon for one to hear the utterance of the
positivist that "customs and treaties are the two exclusive
sources of the law of nations." Or that "there is no such
thing as international law since there is no international su-
perstate to make such law, or any power physically capable
of commanding respect for such law." "You will never
again bring the democracies of the world to transfer sover-
eignty to a league of nations capable of imposing its will
upon all the people of the civilized world. Hence, there
will never be any such thing as international law."
The answers to such questions as these involve consider-
able philosophic scrutiny, as well as an investigation of
practical jurisprudence. Perhaps the pivotal problem, and
therefore the more important and fundamental problem re-
latirig to the value of Public International Law, is the phil-
osophic question regarding the ethical basis of the law of
nations. Of secondary importance would be the historical
study of the origin and source of modern international law
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and the evaluation of the practicability of those rules which
are generally incorporated under the title of International
Law.
In the words of the Hon. William G. Miller, "The ideas
which form the basis of a code may be philosophic, and, in
truth, the only satisfactory arrangement of legal rules will
be one where the philosophical ideas underlying them are
kept clearly in view. But the scientific arrangement of a
great body of laws for practical purposes must not be taken
for the sum and substance of the philosophy of law. Be-
yond practical jurisprudence we have the Philosophy of
Law. The scientific stage indicates that the idea of Right is
explicit-that mankind has become conscious of Right, as an
idea distinct from other ethical and intellectual phenomena.
But science merely arranges in groups legal phenomena, and
stops there; its practical end is served, and it has no 'need
of going further, either to inquire into the history. of the
doctrines laid down or to discover whether there is any
ultimate reason for them. In.point of fact, however, science
and philosophy shade into one another, and no hard and
fast line can be drawn between them. And so, as in the
physical sciences, discussions on legal topics frequently as-
sume a philosophical aspect. The systematic development
of positive law and treaty may be taken to represent the
'Natural History' stage of the science in which the legal
phenomena are catalogued and arranged. But the human
mind refuses to stop arbitrarily at this point and ask no
more questions. If we could conceive law in an ideal state
of perfection, and reduced to a perfect code, so that litiga-
tion would be a practical impossibility, and legislation abso-
lutely unnecessary, a series of questions would still present
themselves, and press for a solution. What is Law, as dis-
tinguished from a particular law? Is it a decision of every
conceivable case that can occur? Or is it a general rule
that embraces a large number of individual cases? Whence
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does it derive its authority? Is it the authority of the
parliament or king who has enacted it, or its own inherent
reasonableness? Whence is our knowledge of law derived?
Is it a revelation from God? It is a mere generalization
from the facts of external nature? Is it an arbitrary in-
vention of man himself? By what faculty do we declare
one act to be right and another wrong? Are legal judg-
ments merely a portion of our moral ones? These ques-
tions, and such as these, belong to the philosophy of law."
A similar acknowledgment of the role which philosophy
plays in a complete account of jurisprudence might be added
from the pen of a distinguished late Professor of Law at
the University of Notre Dame. The Hon. Dudley G. Woot-
en begins his Lectures on the History of Law with the state-
ment that "Philosophy has been defined as 'completely uni-
fied knowledge' or as 'the science of totality of things.'
Literally and by tradition it signifies the love or pursuit of
knowledge or wisdom.
"Any subject that is capable of being reduced to a his-
torical system and analyzed into its nature, origin, sources,
development and fundamental principles, is in itself one for
philosophical study, as part of the science of unified knowl-
edge or the totality of things. In this sense, Law is a proper
subject for study as a branch of philosophy."
In discussing the validity of the concept of modern In-
ternational Law one ordinarily turns the pages of history
back to the 16th and 17th centuries when modern nations
were beginning to take shape. The Peace of Westphalia,
in 1648, definitely closed the conflict that had convulsed
Germany for more than a century. This peace became a
formal abrogation of the sovereignty of Rome as well as
the sovereignty of the Emperor. "Hannis Taylor says
"That peace set the final seal on the disintegration of the
World Empire, at once of pope and emperor, and made pos-
sible the complete realization of the doctrine of'Grotius,
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the doctrine of sovereignty of states. The Peace of West-
phalia did not create international law, but it made a true
science of international law realizable." 1
Judge Wooten takes exception to this interpretation and
declres that "on the contrary, it renders it impossible of
realization as a harmonious and solvent instrument of ethi-
cal conduct. After the Peace of Westphalia and its ensuing
treaty the ardent conception of the jus gentium and of jus
inter gentes was completely shattered and for jus was sub-
stituted lex-a wholly different concept-the difference be-
ing between fundamental justice and artificial, arbitrary
rule which necessarily can have no binding sanction because
it emanates from no supreme law-making power, and can
only be enforced by coercion or war. In fact, modern 'In-
ternational Law' is no law at all, but a series of contractual
and conventional obligations, dependent for their origin and
enforcement upon a consent of the contracting nations."
In this forceful indictment, Judge Wooten does not mean
to imply that there is no ethical basis for international law,
nor does he mean to say that the Protestant revolt destroyed
that ethical basis. In his Lectures on the History of Law
he defines international law as that "system of rules and
usages governing the relations and intercourse of sovereign
states. 'It is founded partly upon divine law and partly
upon agreements and customs, expressed or implied." He
defines divine law as law "prescribed by divine authority,
either directly by revelation or indirectly through the opera-
tions of the forces of nature as discovered by human reason
and experience."
With this conception of the natural law as the basis of
International Law the common sense of mankind is in per-
fect accord. It is not difficult to substantiate the validity
of the natural law theory. It is not difficult to show to
any mind that admits the existence of a personal God who
1 TAYLOR, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 37.
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is not indifferent to the ethical conduct of His creatures
that states are "moral persons" subject to the natural law.
The natural law with reference to the conduct of nations
may correctly be called the natural law of nations in con-
tradistinction to the positive public international law. There
is no denying the fact that a natural law of nations in this
sense truly exists, and would surely exist in the mind of
God and the reason of man even though no treaties, cus-
toms or usages obtained between nations perfectly deserving
the name of Public International Law. It may be admitted
that Public International Law is woefully incomplete. It
does of necessity differ radically from civil, municipal and
state law in so far as there exists no world-ptate with legit-
imate power to enact and execute laws for the conduct of
independent sovereign states. "Nevertheless there does exist
a supreme Law-giver with the authority to direct the con-
duct of these moral persons, or aggregates of peoples which
we rightfully call states, namely, God Himself, the Author
of nature, who designed the law of nature and the moral
law for all men and all nations.
In the Natural Law a firm foundation is laid for public
international law. It is not odd that the foundation should
exist when public international law itself receives so little
observance, for the foundation of a building can be firmly
laid without a.perfect superstructure. - The foundation may
be of such texture that it is capable of supporting a perfect
edifice. The ethical basis of public international law is
deeply set in the principles of justice and charity. To deny
the existence of such a basis is to deny the wisdom of God
who would otherwise be indifferent to the ethical conduct of
His people merely because they had agreed to live in com-
munities called states.
The question of the ethical value of International Law
is not inextricably bound up with the political values of the
League of 'Nations or the World Court. The universal ac-
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ceptance, however, of the natural law theory seems to be a
necessary condition for the establishment of a set of rules
regulating international conduct in times of peace and war,
a sine qua non of the concept of modern international law.
Without such an accepted basis, law between nations might
otherwise be construed as depending solely upon custom.
In such a case imperialism, military force, and economic ex-
pediency would be readily excused and justified. In sub-
stitution for peaceful customs built 'upon solid ethical im-
peratives, there would remain, based on the custom of ages,
those unscrupulous manipulations of diplomacy which in-
evitably tend to the perpetuation of war.
I have had occasion, elsewhere, to express the same
thought, with special reference to the historical background
of political and religious changes which occurred prior to
and occasioned the conception of modern international law
in the mind of the publicist, Grotius.2
"Some so-called Christians may fail to see why positive
law need be referred back to the Natural Law as the source
of its binding power. We need but to call their attention
to the recent World War, to show them the evil consequences
that follow upon the widespread propagation of such fal-
lacies. For when people are persuaded that positive law
has no other foundation than the will of human legislators,
they will readily reject the moral binding power of treaties
and agreements, and scorn them as scraps of paper. To
those who recognize the Natural Law to be the expression
of God's will, it is clear that He must have intended every
state to be bound by the same moral law in dealing with
other states. For their relations with each other could not
be firm and lasting unless each state were bound by the
same principles of morality as the other. 'Moral' integrity
and honor with6ut the Natural Law are anachronisms. And
when one reflects on the dependence of a nation's commerce
2 See GRO'rrUs, DE J Un BELLI AC PACTS (1625).
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upon the commercial reliability of her neighbors, one is
forced to conclude that, were it not for the sanction of the
Natural Law, the whole economic structure would be noth-
ing better than a house built on sand.
"In the treaty of Nimwegen and adopted at Westphalia,
we find the new principle that 'the religion of the prince is
henceforth to be the religion of the land.' This spirit,
doubtless, was the fruit of the Reformation. Moreover, it
is correct to say that the Reformation in addition to effect-
ing the subversion of the old faith in many parts of Europe,
destroyed the confidence of the nations in the Papacy. The
scourge of materialism and the disregard of authority
helped to obscure and diminish the prestige of the Papacy.
Having ignored the Papacy, the governments lost for a
time a powerful mediator who applied her standards of
justice in case of dispute. No other tribunal could be
found, whose principles, were so lofty, and which was so
disinterested as the Papacy. No single man, no govern-
ment, no court, could be found which was prepared to state
with authority what were the true basic obligations and
rights that underlie the relations of man to man, and man
to state. The Papacy, constant in its adherence to the
principles of justice, right and duty as found in the Natural
Law and interpreted by scholastic philosophy, alone pro-
claimed a system of morality which was absolute and un-
changing and, therefore, available and reliable at all times.
"Whereas, before the Reformation, the outlook for un-
limited progress toward more enduring peace and prosperity
was very encouraging, by reason of the fact that the
Church's moral teaching was accepted as standard, after
the Reformation new sources of discord arose which ob-
scured the foundations of international law, and opened the
way for a flood of chaotic private opinions and self-destruc-
tive contradictions.
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"Religious principles were called into question, and when
left to individual interpretation, lost their influence in many
sections of Europe. Religion ceased to be interwoven with
the warp and woof of daily life, and was relegated to separ-
ate departments of interest along with thousands of others.
And as people emancipated themselves from spiritual ties,
material interests came more and more to crowd out their
esteem for the higher values, and international morality lost
its unity of interpretation. For each nation undertook to be
a law unto itself, chose to have its own religion, and its own
standard and norm of morality.
"In the sixteenth century, the era of the so-called 'birth'
of international law, the nations of the world lost the com-
pass that might have guided them to pacific shores where
their difficulties might have been solved, not always by the
sword, but by a supreme and permanent court of equity.
"Today there is no universal standard. Nations wisely
show diffidence in submitting their sovereignty to a super-
state, or to a court whose moral laws they do not under-
stand. Such a course by some is held suicidal. The tend-
ency of the age in its desperation is to multiply laws-to
substitute leges for juys. The conception of philosophers,
namely, that the recognition of the Natural Law has its
source in God, has been lost sight of.
"Evidently the chief cause of the failure to observe peace
in international affairs is the want of international observ-
ance of morality. Then who can say that the statesmen
who are responsible for needless wars are not guilty before
the High Court of God? Is it reasonable to suppose that
the Almighty should demand an accounting of one individ-
ual's offence against his neighbor, and yet be indifferent
to the violation of rights vested in a sovereign people? Yet
such would be the only theory which could be advanced to
justify the belief that there is no such thing as international
morality, the most essential foundation of international re-
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lations. There is no doubt that the moral law, and its
clear dictates are binding on conscience, even without refer-
ence to the added sanctity of human contract. There is
need of contracts or treaties, as well as customs, however,
in order to bind the individual states, since international,
law, unlike the laws of a single state, has no single subject
of authority or permanent supreme legislators and execu-
tors, nor any army or competent police power to enforce its
prescriptions.
"At the same time, can we expect the statesmen and dip-
lomats who represent the various nations to observe the
principles of international morality, such as we have indi-
cated, if the people whom they represent, and the money-
powers who influence them, admit no such basis of inter-
national morality? For the final achievement of success
which will involve the consent of all people, nothing is so
necessary as an intelligent program of education regarding
the ethical basis of international law. It is hard to over-
estimate the power of the written word, and of instruction
in the classroom, press and forum. When these forces are
enlisted in such a worthy cause as that of world peace the
result will be greater enlightenment, and the final realiza-
tion of those things which are most desirable to a peace-
loving people. It is not within the scope of this discussion
to hazard any visionary forecast of an approaching realiza-
tion of this desideratum. Still this much may be said with
respect to the future, that the war-drums will throb no
longer, and-the star of Peace will be in the ascendant per-
manently, only when the nations and people of the world
have returned for guidance to religion-or at least to the
reign of international law, as a categorical imperative clearly
demanded by the philosophy of the Natural Law." 8
W. F. Roemer.
University of Notre Dame, College of Arts and Letters.
3 ROEMER, Tim ETlrcAL BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1929).
